will only cease at Christ's second coming. Given this view, Augustine must have understood Christ's and the Holy Spirit's functions in mediating virtues as somehow complementary to each other. But it remains to be shown how he conceived this interface. This essay traces the development of this question in the published scholarship of the last half century and augments this review with brief remarks that outline a way to resolve the question.
Status quaestionis
Scholars have not ignored this aspect of the relationship between Christ and the Holy Spirit in Augustine's thought, but neither have they adequately clarified it. Discussion of the question can be traced back at least as far as Gérard philips's paper at the 1954 paris conference. In that paper, the Louvain academic cited a passage from praed.sanct. 31, which became a key Augustinian text for successive scholars examining this question.
In our head, therefore, let the fountain of grace show itself to us; from there it is poured out on all his members according to each one's capacity. The same grace by which that human being from his very beginning became the Christ makes other human beings Christians from the beginning of their faith. From the same Spirit from which Christ was born, these human beings are reborn. The same Spirit who made him sinless achieves the forgiveness of our sins. 4 philips equates the expression "fountain of grace" (fons gratiae) in this passage with the term "spirit" (spiritus), and he links both of these terms with the Holy Spirit. As a consequence, he maintains that, for Augustine, Christ, the head, exercises a moral influence on his body by sharing with his members the Holy Spirit, who dwells in the head. 5 By this reasoning, philips interprets Augustine as giving primary responsibility for the mediation of virtues to the Holy Spirit. He maintains that Augustine conceives of Christ's headship solely in terms of his divine nature, as distinct from his human nature, especially his body. 6 He suggests that Augustine does not explain in a systematic manner the relationship between the incarnate Word 4. Praed. sanct. 31 (pL 44, col. 982): "appareat itaque nobis in nostro capite ipse fons gratiae, unde secundum uniuscuiusque mensuram se per cuncta eius membra diffundit. ea gratia fit ab initio fidei suae homo quicumque christianus, qua gratia homo ille ab initio suo factus est Christus: de ipso spiritu et hic renatus, de quo est ille natus; eodem spiritu fit in nobis remissio peccatorum, quo spiritu factum est ut nullum haberet ille peccatum." See G. 7 Thus, he finds Augustine affirming that the grace-bearing effects of Christ's death and resurrection, as well as his preaching and example, are transmitted to believers by the Holy Spirit, not by Christ himself. 8 Moreover, he points out that Augustine credits the Holy Spirit with engendering in human beings a loving knowledge of God, which is the fruit of divine indwelling. 9 Today, it is easy to see that philips's study suffered from a defective understanding of Augustine's account of the unity of Christ's divine and human natures 'in una persona.' This defect was common to Augustinian studies prior to the publication in that same year of T. van Bavel's groundbreaking study. 10 During the same 1954 paris conference, Argimiro Turrado criticized the view that Augustine places greater emphasis on the indwelling of the Holy Spirit in the souls of righteous human beings (homines iusti) than he does on the indwelling of the Trinity. 11 In his paper Turrado is not primarily concerned with the operations of the Trinity in the human soul. nevertheless, by focusing his inquiry on trinitarian indwelling, he identifies a few key passages in Augustine's works in which the mediation of virtue in the souls of the righteous is seen to be the consequence of the operations of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, and not of any one of the divine persons acting in isolation from the others.
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In 1968 the Dutch scholar Johannes Verhees, published a major monograph on the Holy Spirit in Augustine's thought. 13 Verhees's discussion in chapters 4 and 5 of his book is replete with passages from a wide compass of texts in which Augustine assigns the work of mediating virtues to the Holy Spirit. He contends, for example, nos âmes, l'Esprit est à l'oeuvre personnellement, après avoir agi sur l'humanité de Jésus, mais son action, à strictement parler, ne passe pas par cette humanité." 7. Ibid that Augustine explicitly identifies the Holy Spirit with the work of justifying and sanctifying Christians. 14 In arguing this view, he misinterprets Turrado's 1954 article as supporting the conclusion that justification occurs through the indwelling of the Holy Spirit in the human soul, whereas Turrado insists that it is the indwelling of the Trinity that justifies human beings. 15 Turning to the relationship between the work of Christ and the Holy Spirit, Verhees suggests that Augustine's treatment of this interface lacks depth, even in his writings following the beginning of the pelagian controversy, in which he dealt more specifically with the role of the Holy Spirit. 16 As philips had done before him, Verhees identifies praed.sanct. 31 as a key passage in which Augustine draws Christ's mediation of the grace of the Holy Spirit into the theme of Christ as head of the body, so that his function is understood as mediating to human beings the grace that derives from the Holy Spirit. 17 Verhees concedes that certain aspects of the Spirit's mediation, in particular, mediation in relation to sacraments, are not made clear in Augustine's texts. 18 He also follows philips in concluding that Augustine did not know how to explain the relationship between Christ and the Holy Spirit in the mediation of virtues in a way that would satisfy the concerns of modern theology.
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Gospel acknowledges when it says, 'And the child grew, and became strong, being filled with wisdom, and the grace of God was in him' (cf. Lk. 2:40).
21
Citing this and other Augustinian texts, Verhees highlights Augustine's argument that Christ's sinlessness and human virtue are derived from the grace of the Holy Spirit through which he was born of the Virgin Mary, and not as a consequence of any merits of the man Jesus. 22 He concludes that for Augustine it is precisely this grace of the Holy Spirit that Christ mediates to human beings and which makes them righteous.
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One significant defect in Verhees's pneumocentric approach to divine mediation is that he reduces Christ's role to that of a passive conduit, consisting of the unique persona through which the divine Word unites itself with human nature in Christ. Verhees holds that it is through this persona Christi that the grace of the Holy Spirit acts directly upon Christ's human soul and, consequently, upon the souls of faithful Christians who are united to Christ as members of his body. He therefore criticizes van Bavel for his treatment of a passage from Tractate 108 on John's Gospel, in which Augustine attributes the sanctification of members of Christ's body to Christ, the head, without mentioning the grace of the Holy Spirit. 24 Verhees suggests that van of Augustine's writings on the subject of reconciliation, both prior to and after De fide et symbolo, follows paul's epistles in assigning this role specifically to Christ. 34 remy also argues that reconciliation and divine adoption are logically connected in Augustine's thought, so that Christ's mediatorial role is responsible for the Father's adoption of the members of Christ's body as children of God. 35 In making these points, remy seems unaware of Verhees's arguments that indicate a key role for the Holy Spirit in bringing about the adoption of believers by the Father and in reconciling sinners to God. 36 Moreover, remy affirms that the faith by which human beings believe in Christ is mediated to them by Christ, without mentioning that, on several occasions, Augustine assigns this role to the Holy Spirit.
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Without directly engaging the question of the relationship between Christ's and the Holy Spirit's roles in the mediation of virtues, Goulven Madec's 1989 monograph on Augustine's Christ offers yet another Christocentric description of the believer's growth in virtue in Augustine's thought. Although Madec acknowledges the value of remy's work, he proceeds in a different way from the latter by concentrating his analysis on a few passages from Augustine's commentaries both on the psalms and on John's Gospel. These passages illustrate for Madec the dialogical context in which Augustine sets out Christ's mediation of virtue to the human soul. Madec quotes at length from Tractate 49 on John's Gospel in which Christ calms the sea on behalf of his frightened disciples. Here Augustine affirms that Christ mediates virtue to believers, as it were, by uniting his voice with the voice of their hearts.
The winds enter your heart, the place where you sail, where you pass through this life as in a stormy and dangerous sea, The winds enter, the waves rise and toss your vessel. What are the winds? you have received some insult, and are angry. That insult is the wind; that anger, the waves. you are in danger, you prepare to reply, to respond to cursing with cursing, and your vessel approaches shipwreck. Awake the Christ who is sleeping. you are in turmoil, preparing to render evil for evil, because Christ is sleeping in your vessel. The sleep of Christ in your heart is your lack of faith. But if you awaken Christ by calling to mind your faith, what do you hear him say to you, now that he is awake in your heart? He says, 'I have heard it said about me that I am possessed by a demon, but I In this passage, Augustine claims that the voice of assurance speaking in the hearts of suffering human beings is actually, not metaphorically, the voice of Christ. Madec's choice of texts is valuable because it highlights Augustine's emphasis on this unity of voices between Christ and the members of his body as the determinative form of his mediation of virtues. We may also observe that Augustine does not indicate any role for the Holy Spirit in this unity of voices. Hence, Madec's texts illustrate a form of Christ's mediation that cannot easily be subordinated to Verhees's key principle that Christ's mediatorial function is simply to communicate the grace of the Holy Spirit to believers.
In 1991, two years after the publication of Madec's book, Gérard remy returned to the thesis of his earlier monograph. However, in this article, remy pays greater attention to the role of the Holy Spirit in the mediation of virtues to members of Christ's body. 39 He acknowledges that the solidarity which unites Christ the mediator with believers is "the fruit of the Spirit common to Christ and to all justified human beings." 40 Moreover, he is aware of the charge that his synthesis of Augustine's theology of mediation might be perceived as Christocentric, 41 and he attempts to approach it in more clearly trinitarian terms. He begins by insisting that the work of Christ, consisting in the reciprocal action of divine kenosis and human exaltation by which Christ unites himself with human beings and draws them to the Father entails all that we mean by redemption, justification and divinization. 42 Whether or not remy is shadow-boxing with Verhees in making these points (his article lacks any reference to Verhees), he identifies the fault line in the latter's pneumocentric explanation for the the justification of human beings. nevertheless, remy's posi- Studer's reading of this passage allows him to abandon both the exclusively Christocentric and the exclusively pneumocentric interpretations of Augustine's approach to the mediation of virtues in favor of a trinitarian approach. Crucially for this argument, he also reinterprets the passage at praed.sanct. 31, which scholars, especially since the 1954 article of Gérard philips discussed supra, have interpreted as tracing Christ's righteousness back to the Holy Spirit. Studer claims instead that the "grace of the head," as described by Augustine in this passage, refers to not to the Holy Spirit, but to "Christ's eternal Sonship . . . in the life of the triune God." 51 Studer makes a parallel move by shifting the source of the grace that results in Christ's predestination away from the Holy Spirit-where other scholars, notably Verhees, had placed it 52 -to "the grace of God which sets us free through Jesus Christ" (cf. rom. 7:24-25). Whereas Verhees had clearly understood such expressions as "grace of God" (gratia dei) as referring to the Holy Spirit, Studer reads Augustine as relating this expression primarily to the Father or to the Trinity.
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Equally important for Studer's argument is the concept of mission: for Augustine, the Father sends the Son and the Father anoints the Son, filling him with the Holy Spirit. 54 Studer's argument is replete with Augustinian citations of scriptural passages in which the Father draws believers to Christ and imparts to them the gift of faith-two functions generally understood by Verhees as proper to the Holy Spirit in Augustine's thought. 55 Lastly, Studer maintains, in regard to Augustine's use of rom. 5:5, that "the love that is poured out in hearts through the Holy Spirit and without which full faith in Christ is not possible has its origin in the Father." 56 In a 1995 article on Augustine's pneumatology, Studer further denies that Augustine's assertion, based on rom. 5:5, that love is "properly" the gift of the Holy Spirit, can be logically reconciled with his assertion, based on 1 Jn. 4:8, identifying love with God, considered as Father, Son and Holy Spirit. 57 His conclusion points to an irresolvable tension in his interpretation between Augustine's Christological, pneumatological and trinitarian explanations for the mediation of virtues in the human soul. nevertheless, this tension allows him to assert a closer link between Augustine's account of the immanent and economic Trinity than he has found in earlier scholarly writing on the subject. For Augustine, Studer concludes, the love that is proper to the Holy Spirit consists in the uinculum amoris between the Father and the Son. 58 Ten years later, in his monograph on trin., Studer firms up his conclusions in this regard. Writing about the proprietates personarum in respect to the Trinity, he asserts that "Augustine is more interested in the similarity and unity of Father, Son and Holy Spirit than he is in their particularities."
59 He goes as far as to speak about a "unitarian" tendency in Augustine's concept of the Trinity that carries over to the ad extra operations of the three divine persons. 60 Fifty years of Augustinian scholarship on the divine mediation of virtues to the human soul thus takes us from the more exclusively pneumocentric interpretations of philips and Verhees, and the initially more exclusively Christocentric interpretation of remy, to attempts by Studer and others (including remy), beginning in the early 1990s, to articulate a trinitarian interpretation of this mediation. That said, the overriding consensus among these scholars is that Augustine either makes no attempt, or essentially fails, to offer in his discussions of justification and sanctification a cogent, systematic explanation for its trinitarian foundation. In the remainder of this paper, I shall suggest some new ways to approach this problem.
A Trinitarian Theology of Mediation
First, I offer a methodological observation. In many of the texts in which Augustine represents either Christ or the Holy Spirit as mediating virtues to the human 57 soul, he describes at another place in the same text the other divine person as similarly mediating virtue, often the same virtue. By focusing their attention narrowly on specific passages within integral texts, both Verhees and remy have largely ignored this point while supporting their respective theses. When we interpret what Augustine says about the mediation of virtues in the context of his complete texts, we can also understand how his approach to the question is more systematically trinitarian than it is generally thought to be.
A good example of this observation at work is found in Augustine's f.et op., which was completed in 413. In his book, Verhees cites §43 of this work at which Augustine affirms that the grace of the Holy Spirit removes the fault of original sin, through Jesus Christ, and that this grace spreads charity through our hearts and gives us the joy of righteousness which counteracts concupiscence. 61 However, he neglects to mention that at §41 in the same work, Augustine refers to Christ as the righteous one and credits him with accomplishing in human hearts a similar mediation of virtue.
Verhees also cites uera rel. 25 as affirming that the Holy Spirit is Christ's gift to the human soul by which it is made safe, peaceable and holy, without, however, making clear that in the same section of this work, Augustine states that the soul flourishes in the unchanging truth, which he identifies with the Son. 62 But this passage also raises another matter, that of the distinction between the Son and the Holy Spirit in terms of the distinction between truth and charity, about which I shall comment below.
A further example of my general observation is provided at en.Ps. 103, s.4. Verhees cites as evidence for his thesis Augustine's statement that the Holy Spirit justifies human beings: "From God's Spirit we have received the grace to live for righteousness, for it is he who justifies the godless."
63 Earlier in this same exposition, however, Augustine quotes 2 Cor. 5:17 where paul states that if one dwells in Christ, he is a new creature. 64 Beginning at this point in the exposition and continuing onward for several sections, Augustine comments at length on Christ's role in mediating virtues to the soul without mentioning the Holy Spirit. He first claims that Christ assists the faithful in overcoming temptation. 65 light and the way, and that he protects the faithful from error. 66 He then asserts that Christ "settles the case between us and God by correcting our wills to conform with righteousness and bending God's sentence to mercy." 67 Whereas Verhees ignores completely these affirmations, and refers only to the passage in which Augustine speaks about justification through the Holy Spirit, remy cites the passages in which Augustine speaks about Christ's mediation, but ignores his statement about justification through the Holy Spirit. 68 Surely, if on the basis of Augustine's claim that "from God's Spirit we have received the grace to live for righteousness" we can deduce that it is the Holy Spirit who mediates righteousness to the human soul, should we not arrive at a parallel conclusion in respect to Christ and righteousness on the basis of his statement in the same text that Christ "corrects our wills to conform with righteousness"?
The parallelism between these two accounts in Augustine also suggests a way of understanding the elusive trinitarian logic behind his conception of mediation. Why should we conclude that Augustine is not thinking systematically if he speaks about mediation of virtues in terms of Christ and the Holy Spirit (and even in terms of the Father, as Studer has shown him capable of doing)? Moreover, why do we need to reconcile the logic of his account of mediation by one trinitarian person with his explanation of mediation by another, as if his texts should tell us where he thinks the mediation of the Son ends and that of the Holy Spirit begins? For if we take seriously his principle about the interpenetration of the divine persons, we ought to be able to apply that principle at the level of their operations in the human soul. Augustine says as much at praed.sanct. 13, as I have discussed above. 69 Moreover, had scholars who have examined Augustine's views on divine mediation and grace over the past fifty years paid greater attention to Argimiro Turrado's research into Augustine's understanding of trinitarian indwelling, they might have grasped the value of understanding divine mediation through the principle of the interpenetration of the divine persons, thus avoiding the exclusively Christocentric or pneumocentric interpretations of mediation which have dogged Augustinian studies for a half century. For twenty years, following his paper at the 1954 paris conference, Turrado investigated a substantial number of Augustinian texts focused on trinitarian indwelling understood in terms of the interpentration of the operations of the three divine persons in the human soul. 70 At the center of his argument one finds a passage from Sermon 71 ( §33) in which Augustine declares:
The Holy Spirit does not dwell in anyone without the Father and the Son, just as the Son does not dwell in anyone without the Father and the Holy Spirit, nor does the Father without the other two. They are inseparable in their dwelling, just as they are inseperable in their working, but they are usually indicated one by one through created symbols, not in their own substance. For instance, our voices pronounce their names separately, each with its syllables taking up a distinct interval of time; yet they themselves are not separated from each other by any intervals or moments of time. We can never utter them simultaneously, while they can only exist simultaneously, and that for eternity (emphasis mine). 71 While Turrado highlights Augustine's emphasis in this sermon on the interpenetration of the operations of the divine persons, remy makes no mention of the sermon and Verhees treats only those passages at §18 in which Augustine discusses the distinction between the divine operations based on the distinction of the characteristics proper to each person. Thus, Verhees concentrates his attention on Augustine's statements that it is the property of the Father to be the origin of the other divine persons, the property of the Son begotten of the Father, and the property of the Holy Spirit to be the communion of the Father and the Son. Coupled with this affirmation is Augustine's statement that both the Father and the Son so wished to share with human beings this communion between them and with other human beings that they gave to human beings the Holy Spirit who is both God and the gift of God.
Verhees also summarizes Augustine's identification of the specific characteristics that denote Father, Son and Holy Spirit, respectively, as origin, truth and goodness, along with his insistence that knowledge of the truth does human beings no good unless it is accompanied by goodness, which Augustine equates with charity. This reasoning permits Augustine to assert that charity, which is proper to the Holy Spirit, enables the Christian to know the truth in a way superior to knowledge deprived of charity. Finallly, Augustine explains, charity is the gift of the Holy Spirit. 72 All of these statements lead Verhees to conclude that in Sermon 71 Augustine identifies the forgiveness of sins as the work of the Holy Spirit in a more or less exclusive way.
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It should be noted that in Sermon 71 Augustine is addressing the vexed question of the unforgiveable nature of the sin against the Holy Spirit (Mt 12:32). When this context is taken into consideration, it is not surprising to find him concerned here to underscore the Holy Spirit's functions concerning the forgiveness of sins.
yet Verhees fails to consider the logic in the second half of the sermon ( § §25-33) in which Augustine applies the principle of the interpenetration of the three divine persons specifically to the forgiveness of sins: "At this point someone may want to know if it is only the Holy Spirit who forgives sins, or whether the Father and the Son also forgive sins. I answer that it is also the Father and the Son."
74 Augustine continues his argument by citing Mt 6:14 ("If you forgive the people their sins, your Father will also forgive you your sins") and Mt 9:6 ("That you may know, that the Son of Man has authority on earth to forgive sins") in order to demonstrate his conclusion on the basis of scriptural texts. 75 In the remainder of this sermon he gives perhaps his clearest explanation of the principle of the interpenetration of the divine persons as it applies to the ad extra operations of the Trinity, an explanation that culminates in the passage at §33 which provides the basis for much of Turrado's reflection. I shall limit my summary of these sections to an outline of the methodological principles that they contain.
After insisting on the interpenetration of the operations of the three divine persons in the forgiveness of sins, Augustine affirms the necessity of maintaining a clear sense of the distinction of these operations according to the characteristics 72 proper to each of the divine persons ( §26). He is careful throughout his writings never to abandon either principle in his trinitarian theology: the interpenetration of the persons/operations on the one hand, and the distinction between the persons/ operations, on the other. He knows that to collapse one into the other would result in a defective understanding of the Trinity. nevertheless, it seems clear that, in his view, the principle of interpenetration takes priority over the principle of distinction. Thus, he draws the following conclusion: "when an activity is attributed to the Father he is not taken to engage in it without the Son and the Holy Spirit; and when it is an activity of the Son, it is not without the Father and the Holy Spirit; and when it is an activity of the Holy Spirit, it is not without the Father and the Son." 76 Given this reasoning, Augustine asserts that the Trinity acts whenever any one of the divine persons acts: "Thus it is the Trinity that performs the works of each of the persons in the Trinity, two of them cooperating in the work of the other, harmonious action characterizing all three, inability to perform marking none of them." 77 For Augustine, the affirmation that it is the property of the Holy Spirit to be the communion of love between the Father and the Son cannot be understood without recognizing that the Holy Spirit is both the Spirit of the Father and the Spirit of the Son, so that the charity spread in the hearts of believers by the Holy Spirit (rom 5:5) consists of both the love of the Father and the love of the Son.
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From this affirmation it must be inferred that the Holy Spirit does not act without the Father or the Son in mediating charity to believers.
Augustine makes the same points in his C.s.Ar., where, in the course of defending the consubstantiality of both Christ and the Holy Spirit with the Father, he employs the analogy of human memory, intellect and will in order to illustrate his principle that any work understaken by one person of the Trinity is undertaken as well by the other two. 79 At a later point in this treatise he insists against the Arians that the functions of the Holy Spirit in the human soul, viz., "sanctifying human beings and protecting the holy, restoring the fallen to their former state, teaching the ignorant, admonishing the forgetful, rebuking sinners, rousing the lazy to think of and to have concern for their salvation, bringing back the straying to the path of truth, . . . strengthening all in the love of piety and chastity, and enlightening all," are tasks that the Holy Spirit cannot undertake without the Son.
The Holy Spirit does these works, but heaven forbid that one think that he does them without the Son. After all, who is going so to stray from the path of truth that he denies that Christ protects the holy, restores the fallen to their former state, teaches the ignorant, admonishes the forgetful, rebukes sinners, rouses the lazy, brings back the straying to the path of truth, cures the sick, enlightens the blind, and all those other things which they thought should be ascribed to the Holy Spirit as if he alone did them?" 80 From here, Augustine turns to Ex. 31:13, "That they may know that it is I who make them holy," and asks who the speaker is in this passage. He answers that it is the Trinity itself who has spoken through the prophet. 81 rather than treat Augustine's texts collectively as a kind of rubik's Cube, so that by re-aligning the various passages in his writings, his conception of mediation can be synchronized with the distinct operations of the Father, Son and the Holy Spirit, scholars might look instead at his texts as at a multi-faceted gem. When looking at a gem we appreciate the beauty of its internal crystalline structure as we turn it and observe its interior through its several facets. Each facet presents to the beholder the gem's interior structure as a unity. Applying this analogy to Augustine's texts, we can understand how the divine mediation of virtue, for example, of charity, can be seen at one moment from a Christocentric point of view, 82 and at another moment from a pneumocentric one. 83 It is clear enough through the bounty of texts available to us that Augustine speaks eloquently and abundantly about the mediation of virtues both through Christ and the Holy Spirit, and he does not seem to see any contradiction in doing so. Might his attitude be informed by his principle of the interpenetration of trinitarian persons? On the basis of this principle, I also think it unhelpful of scholars to resolve the tension between the mediation of Christ and of the Holy Spirit by reference to their proper characteristics; truth on the part of Christ, charity on the part of the Spirit. It should not be denied that such a distinction is real in Augustine's thought, nor that it can be applied to the operations of the divine persons. Augustine suggests this approach at different places in his writings, notably at s. 71. 84 However, I do not believe that this distinction establishes a definitive paradigm capable of resolving the tension that scholars have observed between Christological, pneumatological and trinitarian mediation, as if we were to say that Christ is somehow responsible for communicating to the soul the intellectual content of virtues, that is their "form" or application in concrete circumstances, while the Holy Spirit communicates the affective power or desire to practice the virtues. 85 Here again, Augustine's principle of the interpenetration of the divine persons ultimately trumps his principle of the distinction of characteristics between them, even at the level of divine operation in the human soul.
This argument is not difficult to demonstrate. Augustine at times crosses the artificial boundary imposed by those who insist on making distinctions in his thought between Christ as the principle of truth (ueritas) and the Holy Spirit as the source of charity (caritas). For example, in a passage at cons.ev., he cites Jn. 16:13 and concludes that the Holy Spirit will teach us every truth. 86 Meanwhile, in his Tractates on the First Epistle of John, he interprets Jn. 15:13 as demonstrating that we have received love from Christ. 87 But problems associating Christ's mediation with truth and the Holy Spirit's with charity in a narrow or restrictive manner arise fundamentally in Augustine's thought in terms of the mediation of those among the highest virtues, such as wisdom (sapientia) and blessedness (beatitudo), where truth and charity are conjoined. At many points in his writings Augustine argues that a divinely mediated knowledge of those truths which are essential to our salva-tion is imbued with charity. If, then, Christ mediates to believers those aspects of virtue that pertain to their truth-content, he must, according to Augustine's logic, communicate these truths along with charity. This latter principle is evidenced in Augustine's discussions of Christ as "the knowledge and wisdom of God" (Christus scientia et sapientia dei) and on those occasions, in particular during the pelagian contoversy, in which Augustine explains the relationship of Christ as model or example (exemplum) for his role as sacrament (sacramentum). In these cases, the latter terms of the couplets, sapientia and sacramentum, refer to the communication of a truth related to salvation as well as to the charity that provides both a fuller comprehension of that truth and its appropriation by the human soul. Hence, charity is an essential characteristic of both sapientia and sacramentum, and both terms imply a mediation to the soul in which Christ is active. Of course to say this is not to deny that the Holy Spirit is also active in the mediation of sapientia or in the communication to the soul of sacramentum. My purpose in speaking of Augustine's use of these terms in relation to Christ is simply to demonstrate, once again, that he so clearly links Christ to the mediation of charity that it cannot be conceived as the exclusive function of the Holy Spirit. 88 Clearly, further research into this trinitarian approach to the question of mediation of virtues is needed. Such studies should look carefully at the scriptural passages that Augustine cites when writing about the operations of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, and at the effects of divine mediation in the human soul. But, if this research is going to take us beyond the impasse of the last half century, scholars who examine this question in the future will have to avoid the "dissecting and cataloguing" methods and mentalities that until now have characterized too much of the interpretation of Augustine's writing on this question. 
